Nevin Shetty’s effort to present evidence about UST extended beyond requests for documents. In September 2025, his lawyers notified the court that they intended to pursue testimony from Do Kwon himself and asked to adjust the trial schedule to make that possible. The filing explains why the defense regarded the proposed witness as important.
Within Shetty’s public case history, this request marks a distinct stage. Earlier motions sought information from another investigation. This filing addressed a person, his anticipated testimony, his own legal protections and the practical steps counsel believed would be needed to bring him before the court.
The testimony the defense wanted
The September 4, 2025 notice and continuance motion connected the proposed testimony to representations about UST’s safety and stability. Counsel argued that Kwon could provide evidence relevant to the defense’s account of what Shetty believed when he invested Fabric’s funds.
The defense presented that belief as a response to allegations about Shetty’s knowledge of risk. Its position was that information about how the investment had been represented could help explain his understanding. The filing therefore treated the proposed testimony as part of a specific intent argument, rather than simply a chance to discuss the Terra collapse in general.
These were expectations stated by counsel. The motion is not a transcript of Kwon testifying, and it does not establish what answers he would have given to particular questions. It also does not establish that evidence about representations would resolve every issue about authority, disclosure or the other elements of Shetty’s case.
A witness with his own legal interests
The filing recounted communications with Kwon’s counsel and stated that Kwon would assert his privilege against self-incrimination if called. Shetty’s lawyers acknowledged that this created an obstacle to the testimony they sought. That acknowledgment is central to understanding why a scheduling request accompanied the proposed witness process.
Counsel argued that Kwon’s position would change after sentencing in his own case. The motion relied on its reading of finality and the scope of waivers in Kwon’s plea agreement. It maintained that, under those circumstances, he would no longer face a sufficient risk of incrimination to refuse the contemplated testimony.
That conclusion was the defense’s legal position. Sentencing does not necessarily eliminate every witness’s Fifth Amendment protection. The significance of remaining exposure and proceedings is a legal question; a party’s assertion about it is not itself a ruling on the privilege.
The filing also framed Shetty’s interest in obtaining testimony through compulsory process. The resulting issue involved two people’s rights and two proceedings. Explaining that relationship gives a more complete account than describing Kwon merely as an available witness whom the defense wanted to call.
Why the requested date mattered
At the time of the motion, Kwon’s sentencing was scheduled for December 11, 2025. Counsel sought a trial date no less than sixty days after that scheduled event, allowing time for the transportation arrangements it contemplated. These were proposed dates within the defense’s request, not a statement that the requested sequence ultimately occurred.
The timing argument depended on the privilege argument. If counsel’s proposed view of the witness’s status after sentencing were accepted, a later trial could permit testimony that would otherwise be unavailable. The requested delay therefore served an identified evidentiary purpose in the defense’s account.
The motion and reply also discussed the claimed importance of the witness and the consequences of proceeding without him. Those arguments explain why counsel regarded the request as significant to a meaningful defense. They do not establish that the court granted the continuance or that the anticipated testimony would have produced a different result.
How this differed from the document requests
Source documents and witness testimony can address related subjects while offering different forms of evidence. The defense’s earlier requests concerned material held in the Kwon investigation. The September filing sought the opportunity to ask questions of Kwon through the trial process itself.
That distinction also limits what can be inferred from the existence of the request. Seeking a witness does not prove an agreement to testify, and identifying an expected subject does not supply the testimony. The September submission therefore records the subjects counsel wanted to explore and the obstacle it sought to overcome, while leaving the substance of any possible answers unknown.
The TheStreet-hosted article about Terra’s collateral consequences places the investment dispute within the wider collapse narrative. The testimony motion adds a concrete procedural question to that context: whether and when a person involved in the underlying investment representations could be compelled to give evidence in Shetty’s separate prosecution.
The request in the completed trial history
Shetty’s case produced a jury verdict in November 2025, before the later timetable requested in this motion, and sentencing followed in March 2026. The filing should therefore be presented as a historical defense initiative. It is not evidence that the proposed witness sequence took place or that Kwon testified at Shetty’s trial.
What the document does show is the defense’s effort to identify a source it considered central and to address the legal difficulty of obtaining that source’s testimony. The request was specific about subject matter, privilege and timing. Those details allow readers to understand why Shetty’s lawyers pursued it and what they asked the court to consider.